Abstract. This paper describes saturation attacks on reduced-round versions of Skipjack. To begin with, we will show how to construct a 16-round distinguisher which distinguishes 16 rounds of Skipjack from a random permutation. The distinguisher is used to attack on 18(5∼22) and 23(5∼27) rounds of Skipjack. We can also construct a 20-round distinguisher based on the 16-round distinguisher. This distinguisher is used to attack on 22(1∼22) and 27(1∼27) rounds of Skipjack. The 80-bit user key of 27 rounds of Skipjack can be recovered with 2 50 chosen plaintexts and 3 · 2 75 encryption times.
Introduction
In April 1993, the Clinton administration announced a proposed encryption technology that, according to the announcement "will bring the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communication while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Subsequently, in July 1993, a more formal announcement appeared in the Federal Register as a request for comments on a proposed Federal Information Processing Standard. The overall approach was initially referred to as Clipper, whereas the specific encryption algorithm is known as Skipjack.
Skipjack is a 64-bit block cipher and was first made public by the NSA in 1998 [9, 10] . After the publication, several approaches to analysis of Skipjack have been made. The first analysis by Biham et al. [1] studied some of the detailed properties of G and in particular some of the properties of the substitution table S. This provided the first description of some differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks on reduced-round versions of Skipjack. They [2, 3] also considered the role of truncated differentials in Skipjack and some variants. Biham et al. [5] presented impossible differential attacks that are faster than exhaustive search for the user key if Skipjack is reduced by at least one round. So far, the attacks [5] are the best known attacks on Skipjack. Knudsen et al. [6] also published a range of attacks on reduced-round variants of Skipjack. They concentrate on the role of truncated differentials and demonstrated the effectiveness of boomerang attacks on Skipjack. But they could not improve on the impossible differential attacks on the 31 rounds of Skipjack. In addition, most recently Granboulan [7] found several flaws in the differential cryptanlysis of Knudsen et al. In this paper, we describe saturation attacks on reduced-round versions of Skipjack. Saturation attack [8] is based on the idea of choosing a set of k × 2 w plaintexts such that each of the 2 w inputs for a w-bit permutation occurs exactly k times. The saturation attack exploits the fact that if the input set for the w-bit permutation is saturated then the output set of the permutation is saturated.
It should be emphasized that our attacks do not improve on the impossible differential attacks [5] . But this paper shows how to apply saturation attack to Skipjack for the first time.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, preliminaries to the text of this paper is presented. The description of Skipjack is briefly given in Section 3. Section 4 explains how to construct a 16-and 20-round distinguisher. In Section 5, we show how to use the 16-round distinguisher to attack on 18(5∼22) and 23(5∼27) rounds of Skipjack. Moreover, using the 20-round distinguisher we also describe attacks on 22(1∼22) and 27(1∼27) rounds of Skipjack. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize this paper.
Preliminaries
We denote by I n the set of all n-bit data. In this paper, a word always means a 16-bit data. We denote by (α i , β i , γ i , δ i ) an input data of the round i, where each of the Greek small letters is a constant word. By the notation, (α i+1 , β i+1 , γ i+1 , δ i+1 ) means an output data of the round i. We denote by (A i , β i , γ i , δ i ) a set of input data of the round i, where A i is a subset of I 16 and each of the Greek small letters is a constant word (i.e.,(
In a similar way, we can also define (
etc. We will use the notion of a multiset to define a "saturated set". A multiset with k · 2 w entries in I w is said to be "k-saturated " if every value in I w is found exactly k times in the multiset. If k = 1, a saturated multiset is 1-saturated as I w . From now on, "1-saturated" is shortly said to be "saturated". A set M (⊆ I w ) is said to be "balanced" if the following equation holds :
Note that if M is a k-saturated multiset then M is balanced. The original definitions of Rule A and Rule B are given in table 1 where w i is a word, counter is the round number and G is a four-round Feistel permutation whose F is defined as an 8 × 8-bit S box, and each round of G is keyed by eight bits of the key. The key scheduling of Skipjack takes a 10-byte key, and uses four of them at a time to key each G permutation. The first four bytes are used to key the first G permutation, and each additional G permutation is keyed by the next four bytes cyclically, with a cycle of five rounds.
The description of table 1 becomes simpler if we unroll the rounds, and keep the four words in the shift register stationary. Figure 1 describes this representation of Skipjack. In this paper, the existence of the counter is ignored since it has no cryptanalytic significance in our attack.
Distinguishers
It is well known that a good block cipher behaves like a random permutation. In this section, we describe distinguishers for Skipjack. In other words, given a well-chosen set of plaintexts, we will find properties in the corresponding set of ciphertexts, which are unlikely in the case of a random permutation. This holds for reduced-round versions of Skipjack under arbitrary keys. In the following, we describe how to construct a 16-and 20-round distinguisher.
A 16-round distinguisher
We describe how to construct a 16-round(5∼20) distinguisher. Using this distinguisher, we will show that Skipjack reduced from 32 to 18 rounds and to 23 rounds can be broken by an attack which is faster than exhaustive search.
We concentrate on the 16 rounds of Skipjack starting from round 5 and ending at round 20 (i.e., without the first four rounds and the last twelve rounds). For the sake of clarity, we use the original round numbers of the full Skipjack, i.e., from 5 to 20, rather than from 1 to 16. The 16-round distinguisher is shown in Figure 2 .
Consider Figure 2 . The corresponding data set after round 20 which is the last round in the distinguisher is (A 21
balanced with probability 1. On the other hand, the probability that a random permutation satisfies the property is 2 −32 . Therefore we can distinguish Skipjack from a random permutation with high probability.
The reason that a saturation attack works on the reduced-round versions of Skipjack can be explained by the fact that A 20 and D 21 are always balanced in this distinguisher.
An Extension to 20-round
We show how to extend the distinguisher from 16 to 20-round. Using the 20-round(1∼20) distinguihser, we will show that Skipjack reduced from 32 to 22 rounds and to 27 rounds can be broken by an attack which is faster than exhaustive search.
We concentrate on the 20 rounds of Skipjack starting from round 1 and ending at round 20 (i.e., without the last twelve rounds). The 20-round distinguisher is shown in Figure 3 .
The result of this subsection will now be briefly summarized : Given any set of 2 48 plaintexts (A 
holds since G is permutation. Therefore, if α 5 and δ 5 ∈ I 16 are fixed and B 5 is saturated then the number of the corresponding set {(α
− 1} is given, the corresponding set after round 4 is (α 5 , B 5 , γ 5 , δ 5 ), where B 5 is saturated, i.e., the input form of the 16-round distinguisher which is presented in section 4.1.
What's more, note that the fixed pair (α 5 , δ 5 ) can be any one of 2 32 elements. So, there are 2 32 disjoint subsets of {(α
. By the explanation, we can easily obtain the fact that (
Saturation Attack
In this section, we use the distinguishers which is presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 to recover the user keys of the reduced-round versions of Skipjack.
Attack with the 16-round distinguisher
Attack on 18-round(5∼22) Skipjack It will be shown that we can recover K 21 and K 22 of the 18-round Skipjack(which is describe in Figure 2 ) using the 16-round distinguisher, where K 21 and K 22 are the subkeys of the round 21 and 22, respectively. Note that the attack is a chosen plaintext attack.
Let a set of 2 16 plaintexts,
16 − 1}) be chosen as required for the 16-round disginguisher. And ask for the corresponding set of ciphertexts,
16 − 1}) . Then the following equations hold with probability 1 by the property of the 16-round distinguisher.
(1)
If K 21 is the right subkey, it always satisfies the equation (1). While on the other, arbitrary subkey satisfies (1) with probability 2 −16 . Since the length of remaining candidate subkeys, if we perform the above process again with the other set of plaintexts, the only one candidate subkey remains with very high probability. Hence the subkey is almost the right key of the round 21. Also using the same way, we can find K 22 with the equation (2) . This attack can now be summarized in the following : If (K 22 , K 26 ) is the right subkey pair, it always satisfies the equation (3). Of course, K 27 is determined by K 22 . The probability that arbitrary subkey satisfies (3) is 2 −16 . Since the length of the subkey pair is 64-bit at this time, the number of subkey pairs satisfying (3) is about 2 48 . Thus we need other three sets of plaintexts to find the right subkey pair.
Conclusion
In this paper we have described saturation attacks on reduced-round versions of Skipjack. We have showed how to construct a 16-round distinguisher. The distinguisher can be used to attack on 18(5∼22) and 23(5∼27) rounds of Skipjack. We could also construct a 20-round distinguisher based on the 16-round distinguisher. This distinguisher can be used to attack on 22(1∼22) and 27(1∼27) rounds of Skipjack. The complexities of these attacks are summarized in table 2. It should be emphasized that our attacks do not improve on the impossible differential attacks [5] . But this paper shows how to apply saturation attack to Skipjack for the first time.
